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Introduction
 Introduction to regional patterns of sugar 
production accumulation by way of data analysis 
for key (formerly ‘South African’) firm Illovo across 
6 countries
 ‘Centrifugal’ logic throws-up a diversity of routes 
of accumulation, and different broad political 
compacts, despite focusing on a single company, 
(monolithic?) commodity and region
 Detailed case studies to provided by SSRN in 
special issue of Journal of Southern African Studies
The Sugar ‘Boom’
 Expansion: Increases in aggregate measures of 
production
 Geographical dispersion of formerly ‘South African’ 
corporate capital; Illovo and Tongaat-Hulletts
 Reshuffling of corporate ownership (Unbundling 
monopoly capital, Illovo purchased by British Sugar)
 Given rise to puzzling differentials in corporate 
profits
Average sugar production and cane area 
harvested in Southern Africa 1962-2012
Average sugar production in Southern Africa (000' ton)
Malawi Moz. Zim. Swazi. Tanzania Zambia Sub Total South Africa Total
1962-1972 24 222 196 137 80 37 667 1,469 2,136 
1972-1982 96 223 315 262 111 84 1,090 1,989 3,078 
1982-1992 173 39 411 486 104 135 1,349 2,141 3,490 
1992-2002 203 44 445 493 118 178 1,482 2,204 3,685 
2002-2012 278 267 408 626 261 289 2,129 2,327 4,456 
Average sugarcane area harvested Southern Africa (000' ha)
Malawi Moz. Zim. Swazi. Tanzania Zambia Sub Total South Africa Total
1962-1972 2 41 13 12 31 15 102 161 263 
1972-1982 9 53 26 21 27 25 143 211 354 
1982-1992 15 22 23 36 14 31 130 267 397 
1992-2002 19 25 27 40 15 35 148 300 448 
2002-2012 23 37 43 51 22 41 201 313 514 
Sugar mills in Southern Africa
Tongaat-Huletts operating profit and sugar 
































































































Illovo operating profit and sugar 
production for 2002 and 2013
Puzzle of differential profits
 What explains these differentials?
 Hypothesis of two key sets of factors:
 Differential productivity 
 Uneven terms of exchange 
 Similar to focus on ‘oligopoly rents’ & ‘economies of scale’ in 
African value chains identified by Gibbon & Ponte 2005
 Opportunity for evaluation of data provided by 
Illovo’s 2013 Good Corporate Citizenship reports, 
(complimented by South African Sugar Technologists 
Association production data and World Bank 
international price data)
Differential productivity: Hierarchies of 
field and factory
 Extreme form of “industrial throughput 
system” (Weis 2007; 2010) 
 Miller’s profitability centred on maximising
consumption of high-quality (sugarcane):
Profits experienced only in ‘last tons 
processed’ (See Senior’s Last hour; Marx, 
1976)
 Profits highly contingent on reducing the 
value composition of raw materials
(sugarcane) (Moore, 2011)
Differential productivity: Hierarchies of 
field and factory
 Structurally monopsonic relationship 
between miller-processing and sugarcane 
cultivation
Highly perishable (requires immediate 
processing);
No market for raw-cane (requires 
processing for valorisation) (Mintz, 1986; 
Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986)
Differential productivity: Hierarchies of 
field and factory
 Productivity in Southern African cane production 
defined by labour, water and input intensity
 Labour Intensity: 
land dispossession → access to land & ‘reserve 
army’ of ‘cheap’ African labour (Lincoln, 2006; 
Head, 1980; Mlambo and Pangeti, 1996; 
Richardson, 1982; Beinart, 1990). 
Capital intensity in processing and transport, 
but cultivation un-mechanized (Van Bilijon, 
1970; Minaar, 1993; O’Laughlin, forthcoming);
Differential productivity
 Input and water intensity: Labour productivity 
increases rest largely on:
improving seedcane varieties, chemical 
fertilizers, pesticides and;
increasing water intensity in high-rainfall areas 
or through the development of (often state-
subsidized) irrigation infrastructure (Tyler, 
2007; Minaar 1992; Mlambo and Pangeti, 
1996; NDC, 1992; Beck, 1964).
Key characteristics of Illovo’s sugar 
production by country
Malawi Moz. South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Zambia
(2 mills) (1 mill) (4 mills) (1 mill) (2 mills) (1 mill)
Cane
Total cane (tons) 2,460,735 719,860 5,119,944 2,165,058 1,309,145 3,246,082
Average ERC% 12.2% 11.7% 11.6% 10.8% 9.9% 12.4%
Water (m3) / tons estate 183 74 0 133 94 105
Total hectare 24,567 9,300 ? 23,600 24,162 28,000
Tons per hectare 100 77 ? 92 54 116
Total employment 7,954 4,798 23,431 6,411 10,993 6,369
Ton cane/worker (total) 411 154 223 419 292 545
Sugar
Total sugar (tons) 299,494 84,546 598,700 232,723 129,737 403,867
Mill capacity
Tons cane per hour 501.69 297.48 1,051.70 398.92 252.6 642.07
Tons sugar per hour 61.06 36.07 122.86 42.88 25.05 79.88
Time efficiency 87.6% 80.4% 78% 82.4% 81% 84.2%
Total employment 7,032 1,684 2,879 1,467 1,036 3,035
Ton sugar/worker 42.59 49.88 206.32 158.83 125.23 133.11
Outgrowers
Substantial numbers of ‘outgrower’ 
farmers (large & small) supplying 
sugar mills 
Monopsonic mill position → 
outgrowers constitute a social fraction
within a nominally technically and 
economically unified process of sugar 
production.
Outgrowers
 Facilitate sugar accumulation directly, 
 by absorbing the risk/cost (Glover Kusterer, 1990):
 Of cane production. Mill often only purchases sucrose . If there 
is a production failure, the mill is unaffected, 
 Of sugar marketing. Reducing/withholding payment for sucrose 
that was not ultimately sold, or scaling down other services
 Of circulation/transport. Growers oft carry  full cost of cane 
transport, including  losses due to delays.
 Fragments workers and embeds exploitation within local 
structures of authority and reciprocity; evade minimum 
wages difficulties sourcing/disciplining labour on estates 
(Wilson 1986; Little and Watts 1994). 
 Longer working hours, lower wages and poor conditions 
may, however, simply serve to compensate for lower-than-
average levels of productivity (in field or factory), and 
may be captured by either farmers or millers (Starosta, 
2010). 
Outgrowers
 Facilitate accumulation indirectly:
 attracting investment of development aid or 
preferential finance into cane production;
 rendering the absorption of land and water 
resources land into estate production more 
politically palatable;
 encouraging the political promotion of favourable 
mercantile arrangements for sugar pricing and tariff 
protection, often connected to different models of 
land reform (see Chinsanga; James & Woodhouse; 
Matenga; Terry; Scoones; Sulle, forthcoming). 
Key characteristics of Illovo’s outgrower 
supply base by country
Malawi Mozambique South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Zambia
(2 mills) (1 mill) (4 mills) (1 mill) (2 mills) (1 mill)
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Total Cane (tons) 2,460,735 100 719,860 100 5,119,944 100 2,165,058 100 1,309,145 100 3,246,082 100
Estate 2,102,002 85 532,560 74 358,396 6 862,058 40 726,145 55 1,942,435 60
Outgrower 358,733 15 187,300 26 4,761,548 94 1,303,000 60 583,000 45 1,303,647 40
Total (n, % tons) 2,047 100 371 100 5,707 100 ±3,031 100 8,000 100 270 100
“Small'' 1,888 (2.5 ha) 90 337 (< 20 ha) 17 5,071 (3-5 ha) 5 ±3,000 (3 ha) 32 6,320 (< 5 ha) 70 254 (6-7.5 ha) 16
“Medium'' 159 (?) 10 29 (20-120 ha) 37 58 (?) 3 15 (<50 ha) 3 1,667 (5-50 ha) 19 - -
"Large" - - 5 (120+ ha) 45 578 (50+ ha) 92 16 (+50 ha) 65 13 (50+ ha) 11 16 (50+ ha) 84
Total hectares
Estate 19,567 80 6,000 65 ? ? 8,600 36 9,562 40 17,025 61
Outgrower 5,000 20 3,300 35 ? ? 15,000 64 14,600 60 10,975 39
Tons/hectare** 100 77 ? 92 54 116
Estate 107 89 ? 100 76 114
Outgrower 72 57 ? 87 40 119
Total Employment 7,954 100 4,798 100 23,431 100 6,411 100 10,993 100 6,369 100
Estate* 4,520 57 3,173 66 780 3 1,290 20 1,509 14 2,979 47
Outgrower 3,434 43 1,625 34 22,651 97 5,121 80 9,484 86 3,390 53
Tons/worker** 411 154 223 419 292 545
Estate* 465 168 399 667 481 652
Outgrower 104 115 212 254 61 385
Markets, Mercantilism
 Evaded the wholesale liberalization and 
deregulation in other sectors and industries, 
 Sugar retains a strong mercantile character, and is 
subject to a complex politics of domestic and 
regional market segmentation.
 Here ‘mercantile’ is used to mean purposely 
shifting terms of trade, erstwhile anonymously
determined by ‘market’ forces.
Markets, Mercantilism
 5 key features:
 Rents. Prices governed by direct price-setting or tariff protection, shape rents are 
established in domestic market mediate contradictory interests of producers and 
‘consumers’ (incl. man). 
 ‘Residual’ world market. widespread international protection and subsidy of sugar 
industries internationally; bulk of sugar trade bilateral, world price highly sensitive 
to variations in supply and demand.
 ‘Overproduction’. Potential crises when insufficient world prices account for large 
proportions of production.
 Preferential market access. The evasion of ‘overproduction’ has been heavily 
mediated by a politics of access to protected markets, particularly those in the USA 
and the EU.
 Biofuel production. Potential to divert cane processing to (fuel and non-fuel) ethanol 
as a form of ‘surplus absorption’















































Nominal Brent crude and ethanol 
























































Nominal sugar and ethanol prices per 












































































Proportions of export production and production by 
lead firms in Southern Africa in 2012/13
Comparison of market destinations and realized 
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Where:
 EUval = Realized value from  European export = EU price * EU export
 USval = Realized value from American export = US price * US export
 Worldval = Realized value from world export = World price * world export
 In Tanzania, unsold stocks of approximately 17,000 tons were deducted from 
total production in this calculation in order to better approximate prices received 
for sold production.
Estimated sugar prices, cane, factory and wage 




























Malawi 7,336 6,110 60% 3,666 2,444 7,189,650 7,728 37,277 
Moz. 10,659 6,386 60.5%* 3,863 2,522 5,769,337 10,512 84,046 
SA 5,767 7,120 66% 4,699 2,421 12,086,928 28,800 265,840 
Swazi. 8,483 5,643 60.5%* 3,414 2,229 9,461,940 19,788 144,702 
Tanzania 6,485 5,384 57% 3,069 2,315 9,385,230 12,144 144,435 
Zambia 7,123 6,237 59% 3,686 2,551 12,641,462 23,448 187,718 
Interrogating Profits
 Clearly, both productive and ‘mercantile’ features 
sources of considerable importance and variation
 Not sufficient data for statistical procedure
 Counter-factual analysis:
 Simple self-designed arithmetic model
 Impose mathematical relationship between value data 
and physical data
Interrogating Profits
P (Profit) = Revenue – C1 (outgrower cane) – C2 (manufacturing 
costs) – W1 (permanent labour) – W2 (seasonal labour)
Where:
 Revenue = Price per ton sugar * annual tons of sugar
 C1 = Price/ton sugar * Division of Proceeds * ERC% * Total outgrower cane 
production




 W1 = 
	 	–	( 	 	 	 	∗	 	 	 	∗	 )
	 	 	
 W2 = Number of seasonal labourers * Lowest Monthly Wage
 ERC% = % Estimated Recoverable Content = 	 	
	
 W3 = Number of workers employed by outgrowers * Lowest monthly wage * 12
Interrogating Profits
 arithmetic not precise, only guides analysis differentials. 
Three key failings:
 The calculation of Estimated Recoverable Content (ERC%) = 
total cane crushed/sugar produced does not accommodate 
differences between outgrower and estate cane quality, nor the 
sucrose extraction efficiency of milling operations, which is 
notoriously difficult to measure and disentangle from cane 
quality (Formound, 1966). 
 The division of proceeds formula applied in Swaziland and 
Mozambique was not reported, and was assumed to be the 
average of the remaining countries. 
 Finally, manufacturing costs (C2) are divided according to Tons 
Sugar per Hour factory capacity as a proxy for per-unit capital 
costs, but in reality also include estate costs.
Interrogating Profits
 Two Models:
 Model I, Productivity: average values applied to 
exchange characteristics (Price per ton of sugar; 
division of proceeds; lowest annual wage; average 
annual wage permanent workers) so only productive 
characteristics vary (Total sugar; Total cane crushed; 
ERC%; Outgrower cane; TSH; Time Efficiency; Seasonal 
Workers; Permanent workers; workers employed by 
outgrowers)
 Model II, Terms of exchange: Inverse; average 






















































 Productive efficiency,  rather than monopoly rents,  claimed 
the highest RoP in the group in Model I, ran at loss in Model II. 
 The political economy of Zambia Sugar’s productivity-centred 
approach appears to cohere around a three-way compact: 
 State permits company’s access to substantial productive resources, including 
the controversial extension of its water-intensive estates with the acquisition 
of Nanga Farms and highly integrated management of outgrowers (see 
Matenga, forthcoming) and further low-tax commitments (leaving aside 
allegations of tax evasion) (Lewis 2013). 
 Illovo’s substantial profits come without unusually high consumer rents, and 
ensure substantial wages and outgrower returns can be financed. 
 In turn, Zambia Sugar’s economic benefits translate into enhanced electoral 
support in its opposition-held area of operation (Richardson 2010: 930). 
Malawi
 Model I profitable: vast labour and water-intensive estates, 
low lost crushing-time and low outgrower, and 
manufacturing costs being incurred. 
 Model II super-profitable: low per-unit capital costs, and 
extreme labour exploitation at core 
 Suggests Illovo’s Malawian operation retains the patrimonial 
relationship forged in the past between Hastings Banda’s 
Malawi and Tiny Rowland’s Lonrho Sugar, despite reports that 
sugar distribution quotas will no longer be leveraged by 
individual politicians (Gosnell, 2005; Gondwe 2005; Illovo 
2014a). 
 Unlike Zambia, no ‘democratic dividend’ obstructs the 
generalized squeeze on land, water and labour (see 
Chinsinga, forthcoming) by the triumvirate of party, state, and 
company.
Mozambique
 Least productive operations run at an outright loss in Model I, but 
extreme profits in Modell II
 Mercantile ‘squeezing’ central Illovo’s Mozambique operation: 
highest domestic prices (counterbalancing large export burden), 
depressed capital prices, and extremely low wage bill; second 
only to Malawi.
 Buur (2011) has argued that generally direct economic returns to 
the state were secondary to the potential electoral benefits in 
projects of party political consolidation. 
 Maragra mill performance relative to local competitors, or particular 
political returns generated, not clear. 
 Profitability – despite low productivity –suggest profits come at the greatest 
‘externalised’ social, environmental and economic cost of the entire 
cohort.
Swaziland
 Significant profit in Model I, highly productive capital and water intensive factory 
and estate, but less profitable than Tanzania as a result of higher outgrower 
cane purchases
 Low Profits in Model II: despite second-highest domestic price, obtains low 
realized price and revenue due to large export burden.
 Swaziland’s resembles Malawi’s, close patrimonial relations between company 
and state: the state is the country’s largest sugar producer and is effectively 
controlled by the King’s personal trust, Tibiyo TakaNgwane (Daniel 1982).
 Where the price premiums attending substantial European market access once 
stood at the foundation of Swaziland sugar’s profitability, this feature is now its 
chief liability.
 Although the pattern is not completely clear, in this case Illovo appears to be 
blending mercantile and productive responses. Illovo has undertaken considerable 
capital expansion while downscaling employment and services, utilized EU relief 
funds to promote outgrower production, and should be benefitting from raised 
Southern African Customs Union prices following South Africa’s tariff increase 
(Ngwenya-Richardson & Richardson, 2014; Illovo 2014d; see Terry, forthcoming). 
Tanzania
 Similar results to Swaziland, but for different reasons:
 Profits in Model I come as a consequence of low capital commitments in purchasing 
Outgrower cane.
 Strain in Model II due to low realized prices. Unlike Swaziland, however, not a result of a 
high export burden. ‘Low’ domestic prices in Tanzania have been the subject of great 
controversy and scandals surrounding the illicit import of sugar and the issue of import 
licences.
 In 2012/13, Illovo estimated that 17,000 tons of produced sugar was withheld for the 
past year as a consequence (Illovo, 2014e), representing 13% of production in Model I, 
and 6% in Model II.
 Interesting counterpoint to the contradictions endured in the state-led era of 
modernization and import-substitution.
 Previously, consumer-oriented pan-territorial pricing criticized for not sufficiently 
supporting ‘producers’ (invoking outgrowers), despite being a net sugar importer, 
endured crisis in late1970-80s as cost of imported capital rose, international prices 
dropped and companies were exposed to intense taxation (NDC, 1992). 
 Despite ‘rehabilitation’ of production, however, structural adjustment and privatization, 
Taxation is higher for Illovo in Tanzania than elsewhere. Sugar prices remain ‘too low’ 
without effective protection – with outgrowers bearing the brunt of the burden (see Sulle, 
forthcoming) – while Tanzania remains a net importer of sugar.
South Africa
 Regional expansion alleviated South African ‘over-production’ to the mid-
1990s.
 Despite Illovo’s disinvestment, South African operations still claim most 
production and least profit. 
 Low profits in Model I due largely to insufficient cane supply and high 
outgrower costs, only slightly offset by impressive mill labour 
productivity. Consistent with concerns over low rainfall, with Illovo’s 
Umzimkulu mill in particular being forced to close this coming year 
(Mokhema & Alberts, 2015).
 Outright loss in Model II, suggesting that the South African operations 
inhabit the worst of both hypothetical worlds.
 Exhibit the highest capital and wage rates in the group
 mitigated only by the exceptionally high average realized price, due to export 
of non-sugar value-added by-products (not high domestic prices). 
 The importance of value-adding with non-sugar by-products, however, are likely 
overstated in this model, owing to its exclusion of the recent tariff and wage 
hikes.


















Profit-Wage Ratio (Rate 
of Exploitation)
Capital-Wage Ratio (Value 
Composition of Capital) 
S





Malawi 109% (1) 367% (1) 238% (2)
Mozambique 24% (3) 80% (4) 228% (1)
Swaziland 16% (5) 86% (3) 447% (5)
South Africa 6% (6) 39% (6) 585% (6)
Tanzania 19% (4) 77% (5) 301% (3)
Zambia 29% (2) 121% (2) 324% (4)
Model I: Composition of values by country
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(C + C ) + (V + V )
S
(V + V )
(C + C )
(V + V )
Rate	of	Exploitation
Organic	Composition
Malawi 13% (4) 24% (5) 83% (1) 0.29 (4)
Mozambique -18% (6) -55% (6) 196% (2) -0.28 (6)
South Africa 4% (5) 42% (4) 1013% (6) 0.04 (5)
Swaziland 27% (3) 149% (2) 456%(5) 0.33 (3)
Tanzania 32% (2) 125% (3) 293% (3) 0.43 (2)
Zambia 45% (1) 221% (1) 387% (4) 0.59 (1)
Model II: Composition of values by country
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(C + C ) + (V + V )
S
(V + V )
(C + C )
(V + V )
Rate	of	Exploitation
Value	Composition
Malawi 57% (1) 628% (1) 1010% (6) 0.62 (1)
Mozambique 57% (2) 321% (2) 468% (5) 0.69 (2)
South Africa -4% (6) -12% (6) 232% (1) -0.05 (6) 
Swaziland 10% (4) 40% (4) 310% (3) 0.13(4)
Tanzania 11% (3) 45% (3) 314% (4) 0.14 (3)
Zambia -1% (5) -5% (5) 294% (2) -0.02 (5)
